Jei jis yra nusikaltimo bendrininkas (kas yra tas pats, kas nusikaltėlis), jo kankinimas norint priversti jį sustabdyti nusikaltimą, nebus amoralus, nes tai bus gynyba nuo nusikaltėlių amoralių veiksmų. Jei tas, kurį nori kankinti ar nužudyti nėra nusikaltimo bendrininkas ir situacija yra "nužudyk niekuo dėtą kaimyną, kad išsaugoti savo vaiką", tai žudantis kaimyną elgiasi amoraliai, nes 1) kaimyno gyvybė jam nepriklauso, 2) kaimynas nedaro jokio amoralaus veiksmo, nuo kurio reikėtų gintis.

Šitas tavo klausimai yra ganėtinai lengvai išsprendžiamas, tačiau yra kur sudėtingesnių. Jei neprieštarausi, įpeistinu ištraukėlę apie juos:

LIFEBOAT SCENARIOS

The fact that UPB only validates logically consistent moral theories does not mean that there can
be no conceivable circumstances under which we may choose to act against the tenets of such a
theory.

For instance, if we accept the universal validity of property rights, smashing a window and jumping into
someone’s apartment without permission would be a violation of his property rights. However, if we
were hanging off a flagpole outside an apartment window, and about to fall to our deaths, few of us
would decline to kick in the window and jump to safety for the sake of obeying an abstract principle.
In the real world, it would take a staggeringly callous person to press charges against a man who
destroyed a window in order to save his life – just as it would take a staggeringly irresponsible man to
refuse to pay restitution for said window. The principle of “avoidability” is central here – a man hanging
off a flagpole has little choice about kicking in a window. A man breaking into your house to steal things
clearly has the capacity to avoid invading your property – he is not cornered, but is rather the initiator of
the aggression. This is similar to the difference between the woman whose man cheats on her, versus the
woman whose man locks her in the basement.

This is not to say that breaking the window to save your life is not wrong. It is, but it is a wrong that
almost all of us would choose to commit rather than die. If I were on the verge of starving to death, I
would steal an apple. This does not mean that it is right for me to steal the apple – it just means that I
would do it – and must justly accept the consequences of my theft. (Of course, if I were such an
incompetent or confused human being that I ended up on the verge of starvation, incarceration might be
an improvement to my situation.)

GRAY AREAS

The fact that certain “gray areas” exist in the realm of ethics has often been used as a justification for
rank relativism. Since on occasion some things remain unclear (e.g. who initiated the use of violence),
and since it is impossible to define objective and exact rules for every conceivable situation, the
conclusion is often drawn that nothing can ever be known for certain, and that no objective rules exist
for any situation.

This is false.

All reasonable people recognize that biology is a valid science, despite the fact that some animals are
born with “one-off” mutations. The fact that a dog can be born with five legs does not mean that “canine”
becomes a completely subjective category. The fact that certain species of insects are challenging to
differentiate does not mean that there is no difference between a beetle and a whale.

For some perverse reason, intellectuals in particular take great joy in the wanton destruction of ethical,
normative and rational standards. This could be because intellectuals have so often been paid by corrupt
classes of individuals such as politicians, priests and kings – or it could be that a man often becomes an
intellectual in order to create justifications for his own immoral behaviour. Whatever the reason, most
modern thinkers have become a species of “anti-thinker,” which is very odd. It would be equivalent to
there being an enormous class of “biologists” who spent their entire lives arguing that the science of
biology was impossible. If the science of biology is impossible, it scarcely makes sense to become a
biologist, any more than an atheist should fight tooth and nail to become a priest.

SHADES OF GRAY

In the realm of “gray areas,” there are really only three possibilities.

1. There are no such things as gray areas.
2. Certain gray areas do exist.
3. All knowledge is a gray area.

Clearly, option one can be easily discarded. Option three is also fairly easy to discard. The statement “all
knowledge is a gray area” is a self-detonating proposition, as we have seen above, in the same way that
“all statements are lies” also self-detonates.

Thus we must go with option two, which is that certain gray areas do exist, and we know that they are
gray relative to the areas that are not gray. Oxygen exists in space, and also underwater, but not in a
form or quantity that human beings can consume. The degree of oxygenation is a gray area, i.e. “less
versus more”; the question of whether or not human beings can breathe water is surely black and white.
A scientist captured by cannibals may pretend to be a witch-doctor in order to escape – this does not
mean that we must dismiss the scientific method as entirely invalid.

Similarly, there can be extreme situations wherein we may choose to commit immoral actions, but such
situations do not invalidate the science of morality, any more than occasional mutations invalidate the
science of biology. In fact, the science of biology is greatly advanced through the acceptance and
examination of mutations – and similarly, the science of ethics is only strengthened through an
examination of “lifeboat scenarios,” as long as such an examination is not pursued obsessively.

UNIVERSALITY AND EXCEPTIONS

Before we start using our framework of Universally Preferable Behaviour to examine some commonly
held ethical beliefs, we must deal with the question of “exceptions.”

Using the above “lifeboat scenarios,” the conclusion is often drawn that “the good” is simply that which is
“good” for an individual man’s life.

In ethical arguments, if I am asked whether I would steal an apple rather than starve to death – and I say
“yes” – the following argument is inevitably made:

1. Everyone would rather steal an apple than starve to death.
2. Thus everyone universally prefers stealing apples to death by starvation.
3. Thus it is universally preferable to steal apples rather than starve to death.
4. Thus survival is universally preferable to property rights.
5. Thus what is good for the individual is the ultimate moral standard.

This has been used as the basis for a number of ethical theories and approaches, from Nietzsche to Rand.
The preference of each individual for survival is translated into ethical theories that place the survival of
the individual at their centre. (Nietzsche’s “will to power” and Rand’s “that which serves man’s life is the
good.”)

This kind of “biological hedonism” may be a description of the “drive to survive,” but it is only correct
insofar as it describes what people actually do, not what they should do.

It also introduces a completely unscientific subjectivism to the question of morality. For instance, if it is
morally permissible to steal food when you are starving, how much food can you steal? How hungry do
you have to be? Can you steal food that is not nutritious? How nutritious does the food have to be in
order to justify stealing it? How long after stealing one meal are you allowed to steal another meal? Are
you allowed to steal meals rather than look for work or appeal to charity?

Also, if I can make more money as a hit man than a shopkeeper, should I not pursue violence as a career?
It certainly enhances my survival... and so on and so on.

As we can see, the introduction of “what is good for man in the abstract – or what most people do – is
what is universally preferable” destroys the very concept of morality as a logically consistent theory, and
substitutes mere biological drives as justifications for behaviour. It is an explanation of behaviour, not a
proposed moral theory.

--
Doc

"shedeuw" <shedeuw@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:gpeqat$tni$1@trimpas.omnitel.net...
>O jeigu tas zmogus yra is dalies kaltas (bendrininkas)? Ir pagrisk objektyviai savo atsakyma